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How the Cheyenne Indians Wrote Article 2 of
the Uniform Commercial Code
DAVID RAY PAPKEt
INTRODUCTION
Discussions of the theory behind Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code and modem sales law invariably
involve scholar Karl Llewellyn and the school of American
jurisprudence known as "legal realism." While a professor
at the Columbia University Law School in 1930, Llewellyn
coined the phrase "legal realism."' He then engaged in an
early and influential debate with Roscoe Pound concerning
the merits of legal realism,2 and he also provided the
legendary list of the twenty men who made up legal
realism's pantheon.' After launching legal realism,
Llewellyn turned to the drafting of Article 2, a tracking
horse for the entire Uniform Commercial Code, and
commentators have understandably assumed legal realism
influenced this great law reform project.4
f R. Bruce Townsend Professor of Law and Professor of Liberal Arts, Indiana
University/Purdue University at Indianapolis. The author delivered earlier
versions of this article to the Law and Anthropology Section of the Association
of American Law Schools and to a faculty symposium at the Marquette
University Law School. Craig Nard, James Nehf, Elise Papke, and June Starr
provided valuable commentaries on earlier drafts of the article.
1. Karl Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L.
REV. 431 (1930).
2. Pound responded to Llewellyn, in The Call for a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
HARV. L. REV. 697 (1931), and Llewellyn answered Pound, in Some Realism
About Realism-Responding to Dean Pound, 44 HARV. L. REV. 1222 (1931).
3. See Pound, supra note 2, at 1226 n.18.
4. Professor John L. Gedid has declared that the Uniform Commercial Code
"is the first legal realist statute. Legal realism, through Llewellyn, produced the
most distinctive feature of the Code: a new, utterly unique methodology."
U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 341, 343 (1988) (emphasis in original). Professor Julian B. McDonnell
concurs, explaining that Llewellyn and his colleagues "produced a Code
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One problem with this tale of cause and effect, of theory
invigorating and directing law reform, is that legal realism
is a notoriously amorphous theory. Llewellyn himself
rejected efforts to cast legal realism as a jurisprudence.
"Realism," Llewellyn asserted in The Common Law
Tradition, "was never a philosophy, nor did any group of
realists as such ever attempt to present any rounded view,
or whole approach."5 "What realism was, and is," he
continued, "is a method... Realism is not a philosophy but
a technology."6 How did the "method" or "technology" work?
Llewellyn suggested simply that it involved looking at law
and life from new perspectives. "See it fresh, 'See it as it
works'... The fresh look is always the fresh hope. The
fresh inquiry into results is always the needed check-up."'
Given such imprecise and anti-philosophical ebullience
from legal realism's founding figure, it is hardly surprising
that later commentators have been hard pressed to locate
either a core or coherence for the legal realism movement.
The distinguished legal historian Morton J. Horwitz has
said:
Legal realism was neither a coherent intellectual movement nor a
consistent or systematic jurisprudence. It expressed more an
intellectual mood than a clear body of tenets, more a set of
sometimes contradictory tendencies than a 8rigorous set of
methodologies or propositions about legal theory.
In her study of the jurisprudence of both Pound and
Llewellyn, N.E.H. Hull casts their efforts as "a grand
exercise in bricolage,"9 that is, a makeshift assembly of bits
and pieces from different sources. Jack Balkin, reviewing
another scholar's study of legal realism, asserts that, when
all is said and done, legal realism is something of a
structured by the orientations of the jurisprudential movement known as
American legal realism." Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the
Uniform Commercial Code: Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L.
REv. 795, 797 (1978).
5. KARIL LLEWELLYN, THE COmiON LAW TRADrIION 509-10 (1960) (emphasis
in original).
6. Id. at 510.
7. Id.
8. MORTON J. HORWITz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw 1870-1960
169 (1992).
9. N.E.H. HULL, RoscoE POUND AND KARL LLEWELLYN: SEARCHING FOR AN
AMicAN JURISPRUDENCE 340 (1997).
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Rorschach test, an ambiguous image into which legal
theorists and practitioners can and do project their own
preferences and presumptions.
10
A Rorschach test, obviously, is not particularly useful
as a theoretical foundation for Article 2, and, by extension,
for the Uniform Commercial Code. Instead of citing legal
realism or any other particular jurisprudence as the true
progenitor, it might be better simply to indicate the most
important theories and perspectives that influence Article
2. One largely overlooked source of influence is the
discipline of cultural anthropology and, more specifically,
the study of the Cheyennes and Cheyenne law that
Llewellyn undertook with anthropologist E. Adamson
Hoebel.
Llewellyn and Hoebel completed their study in the late-
1930s, just as Llewellyn turned to his work on what became
Article 2." The Cheyenne Indians, and what Llewellyn
perceived to be their way of life, are arguably more crucial
in the genesis of modern sales law than are the jurisprudes
and empiricists who called themselves legal realists.
Establishing this overlooked relationship is important in
and of itself, and it also takes on added significance in the
context of current efforts to revise sales law. We should
fully appreciate the intellectual engine of Article 2 before
we decide to replace it.
I. LLEWELLYN AND THE ANTHROPOLOGISTS
From the beginning of his career in legal academics,
Karl Llewellyn was interested in the ways law fit into social
and cultural contexts. One of his very first academic
offerings was "Law in Society," a course he mounted in
Yale's Department of Anthropology and Sociologyimmediately after World War 1.12 In the 1920s Llewellyn
became enamored with the work of Bronislaw Malinowski,
especially the latter's Crime and Custom in Savage
10. See Jack Balkin, John Henry Schlegel's American Realism and
Empirical Social Science, 16 LAW AND HIST. REv. 199, 201 (1998) (book review).
Other important books concerning legal realism include LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL
REALISM AT YALE, 1927-1960 (1986) and WILFRED RUMBLE, AmmEiCAN LEGAL
REALisM (1968).
11. See David Ray Papke, Karl Nickerson Llewellyn, 13 AMER. NAT.
BIOGRAPHY 782 (1999).
12. See id. at 781.
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Society. 3 Malinowski was one of the first anthropologists to
actually live with the people he was studying, and thereby
gauge the lived as opposed to the claimed practices of the
people. 4 Indeed, Llewellyn's later suggestion that law be
studied in action rather than on the written page" is in its
own way a variety of Malinowski's anthropological premise.
At Columbia University, where Llewellyn joined the
law faculty in 1924, he came to know and respect Franz
Boas, the great founding figure of cultural anthropology in
the United States. 6 Llewellyn had studied in a German
gymnasium in Mecklenberg after completing his American
secondary education at Boys' High School in Brooklyn, and
he was completely fluent in German. 17 This contributed to
his rapport with the German-born Boas, as did their shared
commitment to tolerance and admiration for different
peoples and cultures. 8 Then, too, both Llewellyn and Boas
were, almost by instinct, critical thinkers and reconcep-
tualizers. Both were unsatisfied with the paradigms and
preferences of their disciplines and inclined to reshape
them.
Llewellyn watched as Boas, Ruth Benedict, Margaret
Mead, and others made Columbia a center for the
anthropological study of culture. Llewellyn was pleased
when, in 1932, Boas and Benedict introduced him to E.
Adamson Hoebel, one of their most promising students. 19
Hoebel had studied in Wisconsin and Cologne, and at
Columbia he was working on a doctoral dissertation
concerning the Comanches. The dissertation work was
difficult because, accurately or not, the tribe was taken to
be especially conniving and anarchic. Could it even be said
that such a tribal group had a system of laws? Llewellyn
thought so, and he suggested to Hoebel a type of case
method he could use to capture Comanche law.
13. BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI, CRIm AND CUSTOM IN SAVAGE SOCIETY (1926).
Llewellyn's fondness extended beyond the book to anthropology as a discipline.
See Allen R. Kamp, Between-the-Wars Social Thought: Karl Llewellyn, Legal
Realism, and the Uniform Commercial Code in Context, 59 ALB. L. REV. 325,
352-60 (1995).
14. See WILLIAM A. HAVILAND, CULTURAL ANTHROPOLOGY 40 (1993).
15. See Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence, supra note 1, at 459, 464.
16. See Papke, supra note 11, at 782.
17. See id. at 781.
18. N.E.H. Hull says Boas and his colleagues "tutored a generation of social
scientists in tolerance." HULL, supra note 9, at 287.
19. See id.
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In 1935, Hoebel approached Llewellyn with an idea for
a collaborative project. He proposed they study the
Cheyennes rather than the complicated Comanches2 0
Llewellyn had come to like Hoebel, and he also was
intrigued by the idea, particularly because of its projected
emphasis not so much on written or even spoken law, but
rather on what Llewellyn liked to think of as "law-ways,"
the manner in which law worked in daily life."
The Cheyennes themselves had lived originally in the
Upper Mississippi Valley, but facing pressure from
westward-bound whites and also other migrating tribal
groups, they moved to the Great Plains at the beginning of
the nineteenth century."2 They shared a horse culture and
buffalo-hunting economy with other tribes of the area. After
1833, the Cheyennes concentrated in two major areas: what
are today western Oklahoma and southeastern Montana."
In the summer of 1935, Llewellyn, Hoebel, Llewellyn's
second wife Emma Corstvet (herself a sociologist), and
Hoebel's wife Frances Gore Hoebel journeyed to the Tongue
River Reservation near Lame Deer, Montana, to study the
Northern Cheyennes.' As surprising as it might be, the
Cheyennes took to Llewellyn, an animated, heavy-drinking
law professor from New York City. They welcomed him into
their homes and took him to a ritualized peyote meeting.25
The Cheyennes even changed the name they thought
appropriate for Llewellyn. Instead of "Stump Horn," a
comment on Llewellyn's small, but stocky physique, the
Cheyennes began to call him "Shimmering, Falling as
Glass,"2 6 a reference to the brilliant thoughts and ideas that
seemed always to come from Llewellyn. The Cheyennes in
fact seemed to like Llewellyn more than Hoebel, and the
latter, with good-spirited jealousy, said he would bow
20. See id.
21. WLIAm L. TwING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIsT MovEMENT 154-
55 (1973).
22. See JOHN STANDS IN TIMBER & MARGOT LIBERTY, CHEYENNE MEMORIES
(1967; revised edited Yale Univ. P. 1998) (providing a respected oral history of
the Cheyennes); see also JOHN H. MOORE, TlE CHEYENNE (1996) (providing a
more recent study on the oral history of the Cheyennes).
23. See Y. N. LLEWELLYN & E. ADAMSON HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY:
CONFLICT AND CASE LAW IN PRIMITIVE JURISPRUDENCE vii (1941).
24. See HULL, supra note 9, at 288.
25. See id.
26. Id.
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"before a greater chief."2 7
The study continued through the subsequent year,
although only Hoebel returned to the field.28 The two men
corresponded frequently, with Hoebel generally providing
the field observations, while Llewellyn theorized about
them.29 It was a congenial and invigorating scholarly
relationship for both men. While both before and after the
Cheyenne research, Llewellyn made enemies among would-
be collaborators, he worked well with Hoebel.
The only serious wrench in the machine occurred when
a severe drought devastated the Cheyenne grasslands and
forced them to begin relocating."0 In one of the most unusual
collisions of the pre-modern and late-modern eras, the
situation and the "research subjects" were saved by the
arrival of a Hollywood film crew to shoot "The Plainsman,"
starring Gary Cooper. The studio hired 250 Cheyenne at
$5.00 per day; this allowed them to survive the drought and
stay put while Hoebel interviewed them about their "law-
ways."
II. THE CHEYENNE WAY
Llewellyn and Hoebel continued to discuss the
Cheyennes and their "law-ways" for several years and then
they wrote and published The Cheyenne Way.32 For the most
part, the authors divided the writing of the book in the
same way they had divided the field work and research."3
Llewellyn composed the beginning and end of the book-the
sections which were more theoretical and jurisprudential.34
Hoebel composed the more descriptive and narrative
sections which made up the bulk of the book." Although the
authors read and critiqued each other's sections, primary
authorship of the sections is easy to assign primarily
because of Llewellyn's distinctively lumbering prose.
27. Id.
28. See id.
29. See id.
30. See id. at 289.
31. See id.
32. LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, THE CHEYENNE WAY, supra note 23, at vii-x,
33. See id.
34. See id.
35. See id.
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Hoebel's prose was much crisper and more direct.36
Almost all readers spoke highly of the work. Roscoe
Pound, who a decade earlier had sparred with Llewellyn
about the merits and demerits of legal realism, praised the
book, 7 as did Malinowski, Boas, the young Claude Levi-
Strauss, and other anthropologists." One of the few who
discussed the book was law professor, then judge and self-
styled legal realist Jerome Frank. Llewellyn and Hoebel,
Frank said in a later book, would have been better off
studying the "Indians" of Tammany Hall.39
What distinguished The Cheyenne Way? What led most
to consider it an important work? It was not so much what
Llewellyn and Hoebel had to say about Cheyenne culture.
In fact, questions might be posed regarding the study's
command of cultural anthropology as a discipline. Llewellyn
and Hoebel relied on the memories and anecdotes of eleven
senior tribal "informants," in particular, High Forehead,
Calf Woman, Black Wolf, and Stump Horn (the same name
ultimately deemed inappropriate for Llewellyn).4 Each
Cheyenne was invited to speak at length and give detailed
accounts of episodes from Cheyenne life.41 From these
"informants"--men and women Llewellyn and Hoebel had
met in the 1930s-the authors constructed a picture of
Cheyenne culture from the middle of the nineteenth
century. Their proffered cultural anthropology, in other
words, was also an oral history. Yet none of the Cheyennes
interviewed witnessed any of the episodes described, and no
formal records existed. One may respect an oral tradition's
ability to provide "truth" and meaning in its own cultural
36. See id.
37. Writing in an article about the sociology of law, Pound said of THE
CHEYENNE WAY:
That book deserves a paper by itself. It is written by a jurist of the first
rank in collaboration with an anthropologist and is in the American
tradition of proceeding upon concrete research. It is written in full
consciousness of the problems of the science of law and of what that
science is called on to achieve.
Roscoe Pound, Sociology of Law and Sociological Jurisprudence, 5 U. TORONTO
L.J. 1, 6 (1943).
38. See TWINING, supra note 21, at 166-68 (summarizing anthropologists'
reviews of the book).
39. JEROME FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL 77 (1949; 1963 edition).
40. See LLEWELLYN & HOEBEL, supra note 23, at 30-32.
41. See id. at 30-40.
42. See id.
1463
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
context, but from the perspective of modern anthropology
the Llewellyn and Hoebel approach is methodologically
suspect.
Llewellyn and Hoebel acknowledged these problems,
but they also defended their approach. They explained that
oral tales get embellished and reshaped as they are passed
on; descriptions and histories become mythic. "There are
gaps," Llewellyn and Hoebel said, "there are ambiguities,
there are borderlands of dubious reliability."3 But still, they
argued, early memories are often "vivid in the aged," and
among non-literate peoples "the daily wash of headline and
sensation" does not interfere as much with memories. 44 "In
sum, on the matter of validity, the evidence is accurate and
solid enough to warrant not only attention, but careful
study.' 5
A second problem with The Cheyenne Way involves bias.
Llewellyn and Hoebel are so detectably enamored with the
Cheyennes that one wonders about their objectivity. The
authors gush repeatedly about the Cheyennes' "legal
poetry," "legal genius," and "juristic ingenuity."4 At one
point they compare the Cheyenne "law-ways" with those of
the Romans."
Llewellyn and Hoebel anticipated complaints that they
had become unduly enamored with the Cheyennes. They
recognized that some would see them "romanticizing" an
"aboriginal" people.' But as was the case with challenges to
their anthropological research, Llewellyn and Hoebel did
not back down. They did indeed think that "among
primitives" the Cheyennes were special when it came to
"law-ways."9 The very last sentence of The Cheyenne Way,
and one which is set off from the text for emphasis, reads,
"Cheyenne law leaped to glory as it set."0
What is uncontroversial and, indeed, impressive about
The Cheyenne Way are the ways the authors conceptualized
law and the normative prescriptions about coordinating law
and social life that they offer. Llewellyn and Hoebel set out
43. Id. at 36-37.
44. Id. at 33.
45. Id. at 38.
46. Id. at 313.
47. See id.
48. Id. at 310.
49. Id. at 313.
50. Id. at 340.
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three core ways that law could be understood: (1) as
ideological rules proper for channeling and controlling
behavior, (2) as patterned behavior, and (3) as something
that can and does clean up "social messes."5 These three
understandings are interrelated and flow into each other,
but those determined to understand a culture's law are well
advised to emphasize the third. Look into what law does
with a hitch, a dispute, a grievance, Llewellyn and Hoebel
said.5" Inquire into trouble and what law does about it. The
trouble-cases, sought out and examined with care, are thus
the safest road into discovery of law. Their data are most
certain. Their yield is richest. They are the most revealing.53
Later in time, Llewellyn would continue to emphasize
cases in his legal writings, and Hoebel as well made
"trouble-cases" a distinctive feature of his legal
anthropology. 4 Writing in The Cheyenne Way, Hoebel said:
[I]f there be a portion of a society's life in which tensions of the
culture come to expression, in which the play of variant urges can
be felt and seen, in which emergent power-patterns, ancient
security drives, religion, politics, personality and cross-purposed
views of justice tangle in the open, that portion of the life will
concentrate in the case of trouble or disturbance.
55
"Not only the making of new law and the effect of old,"
Hoebel added, "but the hold and the thrust of all other vital
aspects of the culture, shine clear in the crucible of
conflict."56
Bringing their preferred understanding of law to bear
on the Cheyennes, Llewellyn and Hoebel focused on and
discussed in detail fifty-three of the tribe's "trouble-cases. "5
Here one could see the "living law." The Cheyennes and
other tribal groups may not have written down their laws;
they may not even have had written languages. But by
looking at cases and disputes, one could see how law
worked in a given society.
Indeed, many of the so-called "trouble-cases" are
51. Id. at 20-21.
52. See id. at 21.
53. See id. at 36.
54. Id. at 29.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 29, 40.
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absolutely fascinating. When two warriors cannot resolve
priority claims concerning the ownership of stray horses,
"Bull Kills Him," one of the warriors, simply slays the
horses.58 When "Red Owl" so severely berates her daughter
for an undesirable elopement that the daughter kills
herself, the tribe exiles "Red Owl."59 When "Comes In Sight"
kills her father, who is attempting to rape her, the tribe
decides that neither the customary banishment for murder
nor death for patricide is appropriate."0 When an aborted
fetus is found near camp, the .breasts of women are
examined for lactation enlargement, and one girl is
identified, found guilty, and banished.6 ' Each case is
intriguing, and each shows the Cheyenne "law-ways."
62
Extending from the cases, Llewellyn and Hoebel also
offer a normative prescription as to how law should work in
society. They express concern with any society in which
law's results do not match what the citizenry thinks should
be the case. It is a problem if the "self-contained world of
authoritative legal doctrine [is] a sort of unchartable fourth-
dimensional space."'
If we think about the Cheyennes, the authors say, we
can see that law should not tell us what we should know
but rather reveal that which we already know. Yes, you
may need a legally trained and identified person to
articulate correctly the bases for a decision, but you should
not need a legally trained and identified person to recognize
a sound decision. Good law, in other words, remains in
touch with the norms and values of the culture all around
it. "This the Cheyennes had," Llewellyn and Hoebel state,
"rather than a regime of letter or of rule or of form.""
In addition, the authors insisted, law should be able to
remodel itself if need be. It should be able to readjust as
new norms emerge and establish themselves." For the
Cheyennes, "all patterns retained around their normative
or imperative cores a joyous range of flexible adaptability,
called on repeatedly-a regime of implicit principle and
58. Id. at 224-25.
59. Id. at 160-61.
60. Id. at 179.
61. See id. at 118-19.
62. Id at 29.
63. Id. at 41.
64. Id. at 323.
65. See id.
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case work, both attuned to the net dynamic need of the
people."66 Respect for the "net dynamic need of the people"
through law and through other ways as well gave the
Cheyenne "a living order in which the individual life was
urged into expansion and fulfillment, and thereby
furthering the social good, rather than being thwarted in
the interest of the social good, or repressed thereby."7
Llewellyn and Hoebel did not argue that Cheyenne
"law-ways" were infallible; the tribe's "law-ways" did some-
times fail to balance the drives and tensions of the culture."
But the authors did suggest that through their
understanding of law the Cheyennes had remarkably
addressed the relationship between law and justice, the
issue the authors took to be the central problem of legal
philosophy.69 Modern societies could learn from the
Cheyennes to rely on "neither ritualization of procedure nor
fixed wording of legal rules." ° Contemporary legalists and
government officials should strive instead for "law-ways"
that were "persuasive" to the people, that let the people be
comfortable with "law-ways' "results.7 '
III. ARTICLE 2
While Llewellyn and Hoebel attempted to analyze their
Cheyenne materials in the late 1930s-a period the authors
described as "three years of puzzlement"72-Llewellyn
simultaneously launched his work on what would become
Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code. The Cheyenne
project reached completion just as Llewellyn's sales drafting
took off. It would have been surprising if the former had no
impact on the latter. No scholar, even one as confident and
competent as Llewellyn, can fully segregate scholarly
projects undertaken at roughly the same time. Ideas and
concerns inevitably make their way from one project to the
other.
Llewellyn's interest in sales law and in commercial law
in general was not new. He had taught commercial law
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 327.
69. See id. at 331.
70. Id. at 334.
71. Id. at 337.
72. Id. at ix.
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from virtually the beginning of his career, and in 1930 he
had published Cases and Materials on The Law of Sales," a
sprawling 1081-page text including 801 case excerpts and
notes, all of which Llewellyn numbered as if to make a
point. In his introduction Llewellyn suggested that the
immense doctrinal synthesis of sales law worked out by
Samuel Williston and others suffered from "academic
abstraction and remoteness from life."74 It was necessary,
Llewel -r thought, "to widen and fructify the field of
study." It was time for the modern sales law teacher "to
cut loose from using antiquated concepts and approaches as
the basis for organization."76 "To sum up," Llewellyn said:
[Tihe endeavor has been to do full justice to doctrine, but to
illuminate its growth and meaning by stressing the facts of cases
and the policy considerations; to reanalyze the field in terms of
present trends and present needs, using history and historical
categories so far and so far only as they help the law student of
today see his work and do his work. If such a reanalysis were not
necessary, it would be well nigh a miracle.77
Llewellyn's self-consciously revisionist text established
his place in the circle of commercial law professors and
positioned him for further work in the sales area in the late
1930s.78 Criticism of the existing Uniform Sales Act had
mounted, and proposals had surfaced for a new federal
sales act.79 Influential groups such as the American Bar
Association and the Merchants' Association of New York
supported the idea of national legislation, and in January,
1937, Congressman Walter Chandler of Tennessee
introduced a federal sales act bill in the United States
House of Representatives." Llewellyn contacted Chandler
to voice support for the bill but then watched in
disappointment as the bill died in Congressional
73. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF SALES (1930).
74. Id. at ix.
75. Id.
76. Id. at xiii (emphasis in original).
77. Id. at xvi.
78. See GRANT GILMoRE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 84 (1977). The book
itself, meanwhile, was thought to be "unteachable" except when Llewellyn was
doing the teaching. Id. at 140, n.36.
79. See TWINING, supra note 21, at 277-78.
80. See id. at 278.
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committee.8
But while reform efforts failed in the Congress, they
continued elsewhere, particularly in the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.82 The Conference
had been established in 1892, largely at the initiative of the
American Bar Association, and it counted the unification,
simplification, and improvement of American law among its
major goals.' The Conference worked not so much in the
Congress as in the various state legislatures, where it
proposed and lobbied for model state statutes which would
be uniform from state to state.' In October, 1937, at an
annual meeting in Kansas, the Conference chose Llewellyn
to head its Commercial Acts Section and, in particular, to
develop and promote a new uniform state sales law.85
Llewellyn energetically pursued his project. By
September, 1940, Llewellyn had produced a full draft of the
new uniform statute, as well as a long report explaining the
thinking behind its many new features. During the 1940-
41 academic year, Llewellyn used the draft as the basis for
his sales course at Columbia, and Professor George Bogert
did the same at the University of Chicago.87 The Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws weighed in with
assorted suggestions.' During the summer of 1941
Llewellyn worked exclusively on a second draft.89 Along
with another lengthy supporting report, the second draft
circulated in the fall of 1941. It won lavish praise and was
recognized as a remarkable feat.9' One trustee of Columbia
University, who had previously called for Llewellyn's resig-
nation because of an unrelated matter, was so impressed
with the second draft that he retracted his call.9"
The draft and its positive reception contributed to the
growing interest in a larger commercial code, one with
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See KERMIT L. HALL, THE MAGIC MIRROR: LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 268
(1989).
84. See id.
85. See TWINING, supra note 21, at 278.
86. See id. at 280.
87. See id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id.
91. See id.
92. See id.
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uniform laws not merely in sales but rather in all
commercial law areas. The Falk Foundation provided
$150,000 to support the undertaking,93 and in 1942 the
American Law Institute joined the Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws as an official
sponsor of the project. 4 Like the Conference, the American
Law Institute was committed to tidying up the laws, but
rather than developing uniform state laws, the Institute
concentrated on publishing authoritative restatements of
common law areas.95 Prominent professors and jurists
researched and wrote the restatements. In the words of
legal historian Lawrence M. Friedman, the scholars "took
fields of living law, scalded their flesh, drained off the blood,
and reduced them to bones. The bones were arrangements
of principles and rules (the black-letter law), followed by a
somewhat barren commentary."96 In the 1940s, few had
Friedman's cynicism about the American Law Institute's
efforts, and, indeed, the Institute's involvement brought
great prestige to the larger uniform commercial law project.
Llewellyn grasped what was developing and realized
the uniform commercial code project would be much more
significant than his revision of sales law. Without
hesitation he folded his revised sales law into the bigger
project. The American Law Institute approved the revised
sales act as part of the new commercial code, and the
Conference of Commissioners also provided its stamp of
approval.97 When the full commercial code took form during
the subsequent decade, sales law became "Article 2" of the
code.
Llewellyn also attempted to direct and control the
whole Uniform Commercial Code project. He became the
Chief Reporter. Soia Mentschikoff-his former student and,
ultimately, his third wife after he was divorced from Emma
Corstvet in 1946-served as an extremely active Assistant
93. See id. at 281.
94. See Harold Greenberg, Specific Performance Under Section 2-716 of the
Uniform Commercial Code: "A More Liberal Attitude" in the 'Grand Style," 17
NEW ENG. L. REv. 321, 327 (1982).
95. See HALL, supra note 83, at 268.
96. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 582 (1973).
97. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 HARV. L. REV. 798, 800 (1958). The Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws approved the Uniform Revised Sales Act in 1943, and the
American Law Institute followed suit in 1944. See id.
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Chief Reporter.98 Some found Llewellyn's stamp on every
aspect of the Code, dubbing it "Llewellyn's Code," "Code
Llewellyn," "Lex Llewellyn," and even "Karl's Kode."99 In his
obituary for Llewellyn in the Yale Law Journal, Grant
Gilmore, himself instrumental in the conceptualizing and
drafting of Article 9, said, "Make no mistake: this Code was
Llewellyn's Code; there is not a section, there is hardly a
line, which does not bear his stamp and impress; from
beginning to end he inspired, directed and controlled it."'
All this praise and recognition for Llewellyn
notwithstanding, he was frustrated by having to work with
so many other drafters, commissioners, and interest
groups.'0° Reflecting on the Uniform Commerical Code in
the 1950s, he said, "There are so many pieces that I could
make a little better; there are so many beautiful ideas that
I tried to get in that would have been good for the law, but I
was voted down."' ° In the end, he did not succeed as
completely in leaving his mark on the Uniform Commercial
Code as he left his mark on Article 2 concerning the sale of
goods. The latter was truly his brainchild, and the enduring
legal construct for which the discipline of cultural
anthropology, the collaboration with E. Adamson Hoebel,
and the Cheyenne "law-ways" played important roles.
IV. CHEYENNE SALES LAW
Where is the evidence that Karl Llewellyn's study of the
Cheyenne Indians influenced Article 2? No one-to-one
correspondence exists between specific features of
Cheyenne law and individual sections of Article 2.
Furthermore, Llewellyn was not a rigorous field worker,
and as previously suggested, his research among the
Northern Cheyennes in Montana may or may not have
captured Cheyenne culture and its "law-ways."
"Shimmering, Falling as Glass," as the Cheyennes dubbed
him, may have projected as much onto the Cheyennes as he
98. See TWrINING, supra note 21, at 271.
99. Id.
100. Grant Gilmore, In Memoriam: Karl Llewellyn, 71 YALE L.J. 813, 814
(1962).
101. See HULL, supra note 9, at 298.
102. Karl Llewellyn, Why a Commercial Code?, 22 TENN. L. REv. 779, 784
(1953), quoted in Peter Winship, Jurisprudence and the Uniform Commercial
Code: A "Commote," 31 Sw. L.J. 843, 848 (1977).
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actually found among them.
However, it is the understanding of law and the
normative standards about law that Llewellyn developed
while working with E. Adamson Hoebel on the Cheyennes
that come to the fore in Article 2. These perspectives and
prescriptions manifest in individual provisions of Article 2,
in the large concept of "usage of trade" that runs
throughout Article 2, and even in Llewellyn's sense of how
Article 2 would develop.
A. Individual Provisions of Article 2
Many sections of Article 2 reflect the perspectives and
prescriptions of The Cheyenne Way. The commentator must
choose, but the overarching thrust is Llewellyn's attempt to
coordinate sales law with standard commercial practice.
This concern drove him much more so than fidelity to the
established common law or to various existing statutory
law. In one of the rambling, quirky law review articles
Llewellyn generated in the late 1930s as he attempted to
bring his study of the Cheyennes to a close and
simultaneously launch his revision of sales law, he said:
What I do urge is that the time is overdue to make one more
attempt to unhorse the law of wares, and to give open explicit form
to the result, so that we see under the wordy cloud of rules about
"Sales of Goods" the very different types of situation, with very
different types of need, already-though covertly-blessed with
largely very different types of governing rule, both in the Act and
in the case-law.03
Three selected examples of Llewellyn's efforts to "unhorse
the law of wares" involve the formation of a sales contract,
the modification of a sales contract, and the option of
seeking adequate assurance when a sales contract goes
awry.
In the area of contract formation, Llewellyn realized
103. M. N. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, 52 HARV. L. RFV.
873, 904 (1939). Llewellyn's other sales articles from the period include: Across
Sales on Horseback, 52 HARV. L. REV. 725 (1939); On Warranty of Quality, and
Society, 36 COLUM. L. REv. 699 (1936); On Warranty of Quality, and Society: II,
37 CoLUm. L. REv. 341 (1937); and Through Title to Contract and a Bit Beyond,
15 N.Y.U. L.Q. REv. 159 (1938).
104. See KN. Llewellyn, The First Struggle to Unhorse Sales, supra note
103, at 904 (emphasis added).
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that commercial parties formed contracts quickly in various
ways. These parties did not want to worry about traditional
contracts doctrine, assuming they even knew it in the first
place. Hence, he tossed out the older notion of sealed instru-
ments,"5 and in another section of Article 2 he made clear
that a sales contract might be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement."°6 Contrary to one of the most
venerable ideas of classic contracts law, the contracting
parties' minds need not "meet" at any particular moment.'
If one or more terms are left open in a sales contract, that
contract does not fail for indefiniteness.' 8 Section 2-206,
titled "Offer and Acceptance in Formation of a Contract,"
disdains older notions that the mode of an acceptance had
to match the mode of an offer and that the acceptance spoke
to either an act or a promise.0 9 The notorious section 2-207,
titled "Additional Terms in Acceptance or Confirmation,"
which in later years emerged as something of a problem
child in Article 2, allowed parties exchanging preprinted
forms with different or additional terms to nevertheless
contract."'
Perhaps in an effort to disguise the changes he was
proposing in the area of contract formation, Llewellyn said
modestly that the revised sales act "works slight, if any,
changes in the better case-law.""' Others saw through the
ruse. James T. White and Robert S. Summers, the leading
commercial law commentators, said Llewellyn's work
"radically altered sales law.""' Indeed, the changes affected
contract law in general, as indicated by the subsequent
influence they had on the Restatement (Second) of
Contracts."
In the area of contract modification as well, Llewellyn
sought to bring the revised sales act in line with the normal
105. See U.C.C. § 2-203 (1991).
106. See id. at § 2-204(1).
107. Id. at § 2-204(2).
108. See id. at § 2-204(3).
109. Id. at § 2-206(1)(a).
110. Id. at § 2-207(1).
111. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT 116 (Proposed
Final Draft No. 1, 1944) [hereinafter Uniform Revised Sales Act].
112. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
(4th ed. 1995).
113. See generally Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second
Restatement, 78 YALE L.J. 598 (1969) (discussing the extent to which freedom of
contract is emphasized in the Second Restatement).
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practices and expectations of commercial parties. Com-
merce includes more opportunities and demands for
contract modification than one might think. Markets
change or disappear. Businesses prosper or fail. Sales
agreements which looked great one week might look
disastrous the next. What's more, a party might be quite
willing to modify a completely valid contract when the other
party requests it. The party might modify with an eye to
future deals, or the party might be sympathetic to and
respectful of the other party's bind under the original
contract.
Under the older common law a number of doctrinal
features made contract modification more difficult than the
parties wanted it to be. They had to fret about whether a
change was indeed a contract modification or perhaps a
rescission, that is, a tearing up and throwing out of the
contract. Often crucial in these determinations was the
consideration, the proverbial quid pro quo required for
effective contract modification.
How silly, thought Llewellyn. Let the parties modify
their contracts in the ways commercial practices and
preferences dictated. He spoke with a degree of bluntness
uncommon even in code language: "An agreement
modifying a contract within this Article needs no
consideration to be binding.""4 This simple statement was
designed to hoist contract modification from the doctrinal
quagmire, and lest there be any doubt about the goal, the
official comment accompanying the section stated, "This
section seeks to protect and make effective all necessary
and desirable modification of sales contracts without regard
to the technicalities which at present hamper such
adjustments."115
If later a party failed to live up to the terms of a
contract, Llewellyn's revised law of sales included, of
course, various remedy options for the aggrieved party."'
He also drafted and added an innovative statutory section
which enabled the potentially aggrieved party to seek
adequate assurance that a teetering contract might not fall
completely. Llewellyn was sensitive to the fact that
commercial parties bargain for more than a promise and
114. U.C.C. § 2-209 (1991).
115. Id.
116. See id. at § 2-701.
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the right to win a lawsuit if the promise is broken; the
parties want also to know that a promise will be kept and
that a lawsuit will be unnecessary. In his commentary on
the version of the revised sales law circulated in 1944,
Llewellyn said:
[Ifn an economy built as ours is on the institution of forward
contracts, an important part of what is bargained for lies in a
continued sense of reliance and security in the prospect that the
promised performance will be forthcoming when due. If either the
willingness or the ability of a promisor to perform drops materially
below par between the time of contracting and the time for
performance, the other party is threatened with loss of a
substantial part of what he bargained for.
Llewellyn thought "a seller whose buyer has become
shaky" should be protected against having to procure goods
or turn down other orders, and, in particular, such a seller
should be able to act before the buyer's full collapse causes
untoward commercial hardships."' By the same token, a
buyer who has grown uncertain that a seller will carry
through on a contract should not have to wait until all stock
is depleted, thereby leaving the buyer unable to resell
anything.11
9
Llewellyn's innovative response to commercial parties'
special needs when contracts seem likely to fail ultimately
became the right to adequate assurance of performance.0
Article 2 allows a party with "reasonable grounds for
insecurity" regarding the other's performance under a sales
contract to "demand adequate assurance of due
performance." This assurance could take the form of a
simple affidavit, a bank statement, or a production report;
assurance could also involve specific deliveries or payments.
While awaiting assurance, the concerned party might
suspend performance, and if after thirty days the assurance
is not forthcoming, the failure to provide the assurance can
be seen as repudiation of the contract.'22 Thus repudiation
in turn allows the aggrieved party to pursue any of the
117. UNIFORM REVISED SALES ACT, supra note 111, at 243.
118. Id.
119. See id.
120. See U.C.C. § 2-609 (1991).
121. Id. at § 2-609(1).
122. See id. at § 2-609(4).
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standard remedies for breach.
Law students drilled in traditional contracts doctrine
and even practitioners who may not have studied their
sales law carefully enough are sometimes surprised by the
right of adequate assurance. After all, the sales contract at
the time of uncertainty has not technically been breached.
But in this area as well as in the areas of contract
formation and contract modification, Llewellyn drafted with
an eye to what he considered the norms of the commercial
sector.
Whether or not Llewellyn's perceptions of norms in the
commercial sector were always accurate is an open
question. When Llewellyn later turned his attention from
the revised sales act, which had largely been his own work,
to the shepherding of development of the larger Uniform
Commercial Code, he frequently clashed with commercial
groups.' Some of the latter accused Llewellyn of not
deferring to their norms and preferences but rather of
insisting that they accept what he wanted.'24 One scholar
claimed in a 1985 article that Llewellyn's rules incorporated
actual business practice "only to the extent that such
practice comported with Llewellyn's view of sound and
reasonable commercial conduct."1
25
These charges undoubtedly have some truth to them,
but be that as it may, Llewellyn did not operate
disingenuously. He wanted sales law to be coordinated with
commercial life in the same way he took Cheyenne law to be
profoundly and beneficially coordinated with Cheyenne
culture.2 ' To him, laws which were not synchronized with
cultural norms were bad laws.
123. See HULL, supra note 9, at 299, 335.
124. See id. at 297.
125. Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger, The Article 2 Merchant Rules: Karl
Llewellyn's Attempt to Achieve The Good, The True, The Beautiful in
Commercial Law, 73 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1151 (1985).
126. When Llewellyn traveled around the country in the early 1950s
promoting the uniform code before state legislatures, he stressed the way the
existing law was strange and out of date for the commercial community. The
ordinary businessman, Llewellyn said, "tends to keep away from this law as far
as he dares because it seems to him to be queer stuff." Llewellyn, Why a
Commercial Code?, supra note 102, at 780.
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B. Usage of Trade
Beyond individual sections purportedly coordinated
with norms of the commercial world, certain core concepts
appear time and again in Article 2, and are relevant to
contract formation, contract interpretation, contract
performance, and dispute resolution. Perhaps no concept is
more important in this regard than "usage of trade." The
scholar Allen R. Kamp even goes so far as to call "usage of
trade" "the controlling concept of the Sales Article." 127
When Llewellyn became chair of the Commercial Acts
Section of the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws in 1937, "usage of trade" was one of the earliest
reform notions he promoted. In particular, he thought it
should supplant the extant notion of "custom." 12 This
change, it seemed to him, would actually strengthen the
normative power of the commercial community and its
various practices. "Usage of trade" could be looked to for
explanation and clarification.
Who would be expected to articulate and apply "usage
of trade?" Who would shine the guiding light? Llewellyn's
earliest drafts of what became Article 2 provided for a jury
made up of merchants. 129 He thought not only that
merchants would be best able to appreciate commercial
practices but also that laypersons were incapable of such
appreciation.'
Llewellyn's merchant-jury idea did not make its way
into Article 2's final version, but the powerful "usage of
trade" notion did. It is defined not in Article 2 itself but
rather in Article 1, a short article offering definitions and
general directions presumably relevant to the entire Code.
Section 1-205(2) of the Commercial Code states that:
A "usage of trade" is any practice or method of dealing having such
regularity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify
127. Kamp, supra note 13, at 360. The author also points out that like social
scientists of the 1930s, Llewellyn was more interested in groups than in
individuals. See id. at 346. "The question then became 'how do groups work'
which gave rise to the concept of 'working rules,' the rules by which institutions
actually function." Id.
128. See HULL, supra note 9, at 296-97.
129. See Kamp, supra note 13, at 340.
130. See Dennis M. Patterson, Good Faith, Lender Liability, and
Discretionary Acceleration: Of Llewellyn, Wittgenstein, and the Uniform
Commercial Code, 68 TEX. L. REV. 169, 203, 208 n.229 (1989).
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an expectation that it will be observed with respect to the
transaction in question.'3 '
Worth noting is that the "usage of trade" need not have
risen to the level of consciousness and appreciation for
either or both of the parties involved. It is enough if the
"trade usage is such as to 'justify an exception' of its
observance." 13 Cultural norms are operational in the same
way. People do not stop to think about them. They do not
walk through life reflecting on their norms. However,
people do act in conjunction with their norms, and
Llewellyn thought something comparable should be
honored in American commerce.
At many points Article 2 spells out important potential
roles for "usage of trade." Most obviously, "usage of trade"
might supplement or explain the terms of an agreement,
making clear, for example, that in the steel industry a 36-
inch beam could be 37 inches in length.8 ' "Usage of trade"
might add one or more terms to an agreement,"4 and in
specialized situations "usage of trade" might also subtract
one or more terms.' 5 "Usage of trade" may supersede the so-
called "gap fillers" which Article 2 makes available when
agreements are incomplete,'36 and the concept may be
central to the previously discussed modification and
redrafting of a contract for the sale of goods. One of the few
things "usage of trade" cannot do is create a new contract,
although some litigants have attempted to argue for that
proposition as well. 7
The "usage of trade" concept seems to be the analogue
131. U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1991).
132. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 112, at 91. In Gord Indust. Plastics, Inc.
v. Aubrey Mfg. Inc., 469 N.E.2d 389, 392 (Mll. App. Ct. 1984), the court stated
that while the defendant may have been unaware of a particular "usage of
trade," "parties may be charged with knowledge of any usage or custom in the
trade 'of which they are or should be aware.'"
133. Decker Steel Co. v. Exchange National Bank, 330 F.2d 82, 85 (7th Cir.
1964).
134. One court has ruled that a waiver of notice provision in an agreement
does not apply in light of a well established "usage of trade." Provident
Tradesmens Bank & Trust Co. v. Pemberton, 24 Pa. D. & C2d. 720 (Phila. Co.
1961).
135. See WHE & SUMMERS, supra note 112, at 93.
136. See id.
137. Wichita Sheet Metal Supply, Inc. v. Dahlstrom and Ferrell Const. Co.,
Inc., 792 P.2d 1043, 1049 (Kan. 1990).
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of the cultural norms Llewellyn took to be so appealing and
influential in the Cheyenne "law-ways." In the way that the
Cheyennes could look to their culture to resolve their
"trouble-cases," commercial parties could use "usage of
trade" to create, interpret, and perform their contracts.
C. Future Development of Article 2
Beyond individual provisions and the pervasive "usage
of trade" concept, Llewellyn also drew on his study of the
Cheyennes to imagine how Article 2 would grow in the
future. The point here is a more subtle one; it does not
involve specific commercial practices that should be
respected in the law or the way commercial practices in
general might serve as a reference for the law. The point
instead is that law must be expected to change and grow in
the future. How should that happen? Llewellyn suggested
simply that Article 2 could grow through cases and through
articulated case-law. 8'
The Cheyennes did not argue for this, but it was the
focus Llewellyn and Hoebel used for studying Cheyenne
"law-ways." "Trouble-cases" were the authors' windows on
the Cheyennes' living law. The intelligence of the cases and
their ability to accommodate change were also reasons
Llewellyn and Hoebel so much admired Cheyenne law. The
Cheyenne cases, Llewellyn even said later, taught him that
law and justice need not be in conflict or even in tension.
I had to get to the Cheyennes in order to wake up to the fact that
tension between form, or precedent, or other tradition and
perceived need requires, in nature, to be a tension only for the
single crisis. It does not have to be a continuing tension in the
legal system as a whole, because an adequately resilient legal
system can on occasion, or even almost regularly, absorb the
particular trouble and resolve it each time into a new, usefully
guiding, forward-looking felt standard-for-action or even rule-of-
law.19
Twenty years later, Llewellyn referred to the
Cheyennes as an inspiration for his much preferred "Grand
138. See Richard Danzig, A Comment on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform
Commercial Code, 27 STAN. L. REV. 621, 631-33 (1975).
139. THE COIMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 513 (emphasis in
original).
1479
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Style" of common law adjudication,4 ' but circa 1940 he also
saw a prudent, tumbling case-law as the key to sales law
development. Cases enabled law and justice to be
coordinated. Cases would make it possible for culture to
filter into the revised, complex, and uniform sales statute.
The Cheyennes, in this sense, helped prompt one of Article
2's most unusual features.
The very language of the revised sales law invited case-
law. The crucial words are often open, imprecise, and
subject to varying interpretations. Reflecting on this feature
of not just Article 2 but rather the whole Uniform
Commercial Code, David Mellinkoff was less than pleased:
The language is now clear, now mud; now grammatical, now
illiterate; now consistent, now inconsistent, slapdash and slovenly.
It wallows in definition that does not define and definition that
misleads-definition for the sake of forgotten definition. It
includes many ways of saying the same thing, and many ways of
saying nothing. The word reasonable, effective in small doses, has
been administered by the bucket, leaving the corpus of the Code
reeling in dizzy confusion.1
4 1
Focusing on just Article 2, John Bonsignore was more
positive, but he too was struck by the language. Article 2,
he thought, had an extraordinary number of "stretch words"
. ,,12
or "weasel words. Bonsignore even went on to count them
up: "reasonable" and "unreasonable" appear ninety-seven
times in Article 2 alone; "seasonably," twenty;
"circumstance," sixteen; "properly," nine; "substantially,"
eight; and "unconscionable," eight.
Llewellyn might have smiled at these distinguished
scholars' "discovery" of his drafting language. After all, he
consciously opted for just the approach others found so
surprising. He later summarized his approach in The
Common Law Tradition and simultaneously jabbed at those
who might approach things differently:
140. "Apart from our early nineteenth century, I have come across the
Grand Style only twice: in Cheyenne Indian law and in the classical Roman
period." Id. at 45, n.40.
141. David Mellinkoff, The Language of the Uniform Commercial Code, 77
YALE L.J. 185, 185-86 (1967) (emphasis in original).
142. John J. Bonsignore, Existentialism, the Rule of Law and Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, 8 AM. Bus. L.J. 133, 147 (1970).
143. Id.
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My argument is that such drafting, by centering the basic
question, adding the normal keys to answering and the available
clear experience and suggesting lines of useful further inquiry,
would provide something much more certain (as well as much
more easily usable) than the hundreds of pages of labyrinthine
annotations to the N.I.L. [Negotiable Instruments Law] which
hide the law today.'1
In 1940, The Common Law Tradition was not even in
Llewellyn's head; the work was not publisheduntil 1960. In
1940, his thinking was interrelated with and powerfully
affected by his research and analysis of the Cheyenes.
Turned slightly, the best way to understand Cheyenne
law-namely "trouble-cases"--could also be the best way to
generate sales law. Contrary to more common varieties of
codification, Llewellyn used open-ended terms and phrases
to invite a case-law interpreting his model statute. The
focus Llewellyn and Hoebel used in studying the Cheyennes
helped Llewellyn produce what may seem a curious
oxymoron: a case-law article.
V. SALES LAw IN THE POST-LLEWELLYN ERA
Understanding the jurisprudence of Article 2 is
potentially of great importance in the context of current
efforts to revise the Uniform Commercial Code's most
venerable article. Karl Llewellyn's use of open-ended terms
and invitation of a case-law article have given Article 2 a
flexibility and contributed to its longevity. Article 2 has
served well as the core law of sales for half a century.
However, do Llewellyn's anthropological premises and his
observations of Cheyenne "law-ways" continue to have
relevance and usefulness today? Do Llewellyn's perspective
and assumptions remain appropriate for sales law?
For starters, it seems necessary to underscore the idea
that the commercial sector has changed dramatically in the
60 years since Llewellyn did his major thinking and
drafting. The most pronounced domestic change is the
tremendous growth in consumer sales. Historians point to
the 1920s as the decade in which consumer sales became
pronounced and important.45 Llewellyn was undoubtedly
144. THE COmxIMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 5, at 419 n.39.
145. See DANIEL HORowITZ, THE MORALITY OF SPENDING: ATrITUDES TOWARD
THE CONSUMER SOCIETY IN AMERICA 1875-1940 134 (1985).
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aware of this,'46 but there is reason to think that he did not
like rampant consumption or the emergence of a mass
popular culture.47 Llewellyn paid minimal attention to
consumer sales in Article 2, and disregarded consumer
interests in other parts of the Uniform Commercial Code.'
It is surely time for any revision of Article 2 to address
extensively consumer sales, a crucial aspect of contem-
porary American life. 49
American commercial practices also have ceased to be
limited by national boundaries. The incessantly discussed
trend toward "globalization" is intertwined with the spread
and acceptance of advanced capitalism and the concomitant
imperatives of accumulation, competition, commodification,
and profit-maximization. 50  Sales and sales law are
obviously central to the process, as recognized by the
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the Inter-
national Sale of Goods and by American teachers and
scholars who have begun to bring an international per-
spective to sales law. 5'
146. Llewellyn said as early as 1936, "And, as a further problem, there will
be the thus far almost unnoticed consumer, and his protection. For even in
1870, there were consumers in America." Llewellyn, On Warranty of Quality
and Society, supra note 103, at 744.
147. Perhaps battling a hangover or a foul mood, Llewellyn wrote:
[Liook a minute at this tawdry spreading culture-the sentimental
drool or he-man stuff that one sees as fiction; the leaded testimony at
the murder trial; the intimate venomous details of an off-color sex
dispute; the blat of poorer jazz; the riot of cliche of thought and phrase;
the empty prettiness of poster girls.
Kamp, supra note 12, at 357, n.144 (quoting Karl N. Llewellyn, "This Cut-Rate
American Culture" 7-8 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Albany Law
Review)).
148. See Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, and the
Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from The Uniform Commercial Code, 78
MINN. L. REV. 83, 120-36 (1993).
149. See generally EARL SCHORRIS, A NATION OF SALESMEN: THE TYRANNY OF
THE MARKET AND THE SUBVERSION OF CULTURE (1994) (arguing that buying and
selling have become virtually a defining characteristic of Americanism).
150. One provocative scholar has indeed suggested that we speak not of
"globalization" but rather "the universalization of capitalism." Ellen Meiskins
Wood, Modernity, Postmodernity, or Capitalism? in CAPITALISM AND THE
INFORMATION AGE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF THE GLOBAL COMMUNICATION
REVOLUTION 46 (ROBERT W. MCCHESNEY, ELLEN MEISKENS WOOD, & JOHN
BELLAMYFOSTER, EDS., 1998).
151. Recent texts with national and international sensitivities include,
CLAYTON P. GILETrE & STEVEN D. WALT, SALES LAW: CASES, PROBLEMS, AND
MATERIALS ON DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL (1999); JOHN 0. HONNOLD &
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With sales having become both consumer-oriented and
international, one wonders if the core analogies and
assumptions of Llewellyn's Article 2 remain appropriate. A
tribal group in this regard does not seem comparable to the
modern commercial sector. Tribes are united by a clear
network of families and clans or, at least, have a strong
degree of common character and self-recognition. Contem-
porary merchants and businessmen, by contrast, are not
defined by shared self-recognition but rather by the way
they buy and sell with an eye to profit. Scholars have
perceptively suggested that in Llewellyn's mind merchants
were the equivalent of the Cheyennes, 5 ' but almost sixty
years after Llewellyn did his primary Article 2 drafting,
this comparison seems at best a metaphor and most cer-
tainly not a functional analogy.
More generally, one has to wonder to what extent the
commercial sector or even sub-parts of that sector have
anything resembling the coherent cultural norms Llewellyn
perceived among the Cheyennes? Surely whatever mer-
chants and businessmen share is not as deep as the
Cheyennes' epistemology, sense of the supernatural,
understanding of family, and so on. The commercial
consensus, to the extent it exists, involves only commercial
practices and behaviors. But, is there even a consensus in
this specific sense?
Professor Chris Williams argues that there is no
empirical evidence for the projected consensus.13 Williams
reminds us that "[bluyers and sellers have interests that
are largely antagonistic. Both wish to maximize profit, but
each can do so only at the other's expense."" Williams may
overstate the antagonism. As noted earlier, buyers and
sellers sometimes cooperate and compromise, if only with
an eye to future transactions. Yet Williams is correct in
suggesting that usages of trade are often vague or non-
existent. Certainly when the parties actually go to court to
CURTIS R. REITZ, SALES TRANSACTIONS: DOMEsTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1992); and JOHN E. MURRAY & HARRY M. FLETCHER, SALES AND LEASES:
PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS
(1994).
152. Kamp toys with this comparison, see Kamp, supra note 13, at 357; see
also Danzig, supra note 138, at 622-23.
153. See Chris Williams, The Search for Bases of Decision in Commercial
Law: Llewellyn Redux, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1495, 1508 (1984).
154. Id. at 1507.
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resolve a dispute, one might rest assured that whatever
trade customs do exist are neither precise nor powerful
enough to eliminate disagreement.
Both a more modem anthropology and the evolving
understanding of American culture and society suggest how
Llewellyn might have gone astray. Modem anthropologists
suggest that we comprehend other cultures as much
through interpretation and projection as through obser-
vation and science. The Cheyenne culture no doubt had
some degree of coherence, but the type of controlling unity
Llewellyn and his colleague E. Adamson Hoebel perceived
tells us as much about the perceivers as it does about the
perceived. The great lessons Llewellyn and Hoebel learned
from the Cheyennes are in part a result of efforts to answer
deep, haunting questions about the American present
rather than their search of the Cheyenne past. Anthro-
pologist Clifford Geertz has warned us to back off of this
kind of theorizing because "[t]here are enough profundities
in the world already."' 55
Furthermore, traditional cultural anthropology as a
whole may not be well suited for the complexities and
contradictions of twentieth-century American society.
Surely a trained cultural anthropologist can perceive
patterns and underscore traits in American society in an
especially astute way. But the society as a whole lacks the
simplicity and degree of unity typical of the tribal or
traditional societies customarily studied by cultural
anthropologists. American Studies scholars-cultural
anthropologists of their own stripe-have long since
abandoned notions of a unified American culture. They
speak of dominant and subordinate cultures; acknowledge
differences by race, ethnicity, region, and class; and stress
the tensions and conflicts more so than the unity. The
notion of American culture as "melting pot," in which
difference blends into sameness has given way to a "stew
pot" with different recognizable ingredients or perhaps a
"tipped pot" for which the ingredients have spilled out all
over the floor.5 6
155. CLIFFoRD GEERTZ, THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTUREs 21 (1973).
156. For an illustrative but not an exhaustive list of recent works that
suggests a transformation in the American Studies model see SACVAN
BERCOVITCH, THE RiTEs OF ASSENT: TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE SYMBOLIC
CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA (1993); Linda Kerber, Diversity and The
Transformation of American Studies, 41 AM. Q. 415 (1989); George Lipsitz,
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VI. CONCLUSION
Appreciation of Karl Llewellyn's The Cheyenne Way
helps us conceptualize the jurisprudence of Article 2. Of
course no single intellectual or social development is solely
responsible for the variety of legal thought at the heart of
sales law. Beyond the remarkably shapeless "legal realism,"
a more generalized anti-formalism, New Deal politics,
squabbles between the faculties at leading law schools, and
even German romanticism can be seen as inspiring Article
2."' Ideas and theories do not come about through a kind of
intellectual bumper-cars; one type of thought does not
unilaterally send another spinning.
But still, cultural anthropology, Karl Llewellyn's
collaboration with the anthropologist E. Adamson Hoebel,
and the perceived "law-ways" of the Cheyennes merit
recognition for their impact on and interrelationship with
Article 2 jurisprudence. Article 2 resulted in a deference to
commercial practices, valorization of "usage of trade," and
faith in case-law evolution. Llewellyn's achievement was
intellectually spectacular and for decades strikingly
successful, but in light of intellectual shifts and societal
change, a new or at least updated version of jurisprudence
must be brought to bear. "Shimmering, Falling as Glass"
and the Cheyennes who gave him that name should be
acknowledged but not given full rein in development of the
next law of sales.
"Sent For You Yesterday, Here You Come Today:" American Studies Scholarship
and the New Social Movements, 40 CuLTURAL CRITIQuE 203 (1998); and Mary
Helen Washington, "Disturbing the Peace: What Happens to American Studies If
You Put African American Studies at the Center?" 50 AM. Q. 1 (1998).
157. For a discussion of antiformalism, see GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN
LAW, supra note 78, 68-86. Kamp compares Llewellyn's jurisprudence to New
Deal thought. Kamp, supra note 13, at 381-90. Hull points out that many from
Columbia Law School and the Yale Law School found their way into the early
pantheon of legal realists. HULL, supra note 9, at 211. Rival Harvard Law
School, meanwhile, was unrepresented. Id. See generally James Whitman,
Commercial Law and American Volk: A Note on Llewellyn's German Sources for
the Uniform Commercial Code, 97 YALE L.J. 156 (1987) (exploring links between
Llewellyn and German romanticism).
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